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1 
PIERCING THE BUBBLE: WHY BUBBLE ZONE 
REGULATIONS ARE CONTENT BASED 
RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH 
 
HUBERT J. ZANCZAK1 
 
Cite as: Hubert J. Zanczak, Piercing the Bubble: Why Bubble Zone Regulations are 
Content Based Restrictions on Speech, 15 SEVENTH CIR. REV. ___ (2020).  
 
Since the Supreme Court found that access to abortion is a 
constitutional right in Roe v. Wade, the debate around abortion moved 
to the streets, particularly around the actual facilities that offer 
abortions.2 Some of those protests have been peaceful, others have 
taken a tragic turn for the worst, resulting in injuries and death.3 In 
response, courts imposed injunctions aimed at the most unruly 
protestors and legislatures passed laws limiting the ability to protest 
within a certain distance of an abortion clinic and its patients.4 In 
                                                 
1
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2009, the City of Chicago enacted an ordinance that created an eight-
foot exclusion zone around the patient, when within fifty feet of an 
entrance to a healthcare facility.5 And in February 2019, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the Chicago ordinance.6 The court found that the 
ordinance was content neutral and narrowly tailored to achieve a 
significant governmental interest, relying on a nineteen-year-old 
Supreme Court precedent in Hill v. Colorado that upheld a nearly 
identical regulation.7  
While the Seventh Circuit quickly resolved the challenge in Price 
v. City of Chicago, it spent the next twenty pages questioning today’s 
validity of that precedent.8 As a result, while the ordinance is in effect 
in Chicago, the Supreme Court is also reviewing the pending petition 
for writ of certiorari.9 If the Court grants certiorari in this case, it could 
be used as a vehicle to strike down the precedent upholding abortion 
clinic bubble zone regulations. It could also be an opportunity for the 
Court to provide some clarity on the intersection of the First 
Amendment’s protections for free speech with the Fourteenth 
Amendment's fundamental right to privacy, including the right to 
access abortion. 
The tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendments is 
especially visible in the context of anti-abortion protests. In response 
to this tension, courts imposed injunctions and legislatures passed laws 
limiting speech outside of reproductive healthcare facilities. Those 
injunctions and statutes have two common elements, referred to here 
as buffer zone and bubble zone. Buffer zone refers to an exclusion area 
within a certain number of feet of an entrance to an abortion clinic, 
which prohibits anyone from standing within that exclusion zone. 
Bubble zone refers to a floating exclusion zone around a patient 
                                                 
5
 Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2019).  
6
 Id.  
7
 Id. at 1119; 530 U.S. 703. 
8
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9
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3 
entering or leaving the clinic, which prohibits others from approaching 
within a certain radius of that patient, for the purpose of protesting 
their choice. 
While these laws are clearly aimed at suppressing anti-abortion 
protests in public places, the Supreme Court has deemed buffer and 
bubble zones to be content neutral.10 As content neutral regulations 
they are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires that they be 
narrowly tailored toward a significant state interest.11 If the Court 
found these regulations to be content based, meaning that they regulate 
the speech based on its content, then they would have to survive strict 
scrutiny—a very high standard which requires that the laws be 
narrowly tailored toward a compelling governmental interest.12 
How did the Court then find that these laws, which are explicitly 
aimed at suppressing anti-abortion speech in public places, are content 
neutral? The Court did so by applying a content neutrality test that is 
different from the traditional test which it has consistently applied in 
other contexts.13 The Court’s desire to find bubble and buffer zones to 
be content neutral caused it to depart from its traditional analysis, in 
order to apply a lower constitutional scrutiny, thereby assuring that at 
least some buffer and bubble zones survive the constitutional 
challenge. But nearly twenty years after Hill, its rationale cannot 
withstand the test of time. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, both 
in the context of abortion and non-abortion speech, directly undercut 
the very reasoning the Court used to deem bubble and buffer zones 
content neutral.14 
As the Seventh Circuit correctly pointed out in Price, the Court’s 
ruling in Hill is flawed and cannot be reconciled today.15 However, it 
remains binding precedent. This article will discuss why the Court’s 
content based analysis in Hill is flawed and why the Court should 
                                                 
10
 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719; McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 497 (2014). 
11
 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477. 
12
 Id. at 478. 
13
 See infra Part IV. 
14
 See infra Part III.  
15
 See Price, 915 F.3d at 1117. 
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correct it. Part I of this article discusses the evolution of bubble and 
buffer zones and its treatment by the Court. Part II discusses the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Price. Part III explores the tensions that 
the Seventh Circuit noted between Hill and its subsequent First 
Amendment jurisprudence. And Part IV explains why buffer and 
bubble zone regulations are content based and thus should be subject 
to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny, strict scrutiny. Part IV 
also explains how the regulations can, with slight modifications, 
survive strict scrutiny.  
 
REVIEW OF SUPREME COURT BUBBLE AND BUFFER ZONE PRECEDENT 
 
Madsen v. Women's Health Center 
 
In 1993, a Florida state court entered a permanent injunction 
against local abortion protestors.16 The injunction contained, amongst 
other things, two specific prohibitions. First, the protestors could not 
approach within thirty-six feet of a specific abortion clinic’s entrance 
(the buffer zone).17 Second, the protestors were prohibited from 
"physically approaching" patients of the clinic within 300 feet of that 
clinic (the bubble zone).18 The injunction was challenged in the state 
and federal courts. The state appellate court and the Florida Supreme 
Court affirmed the injunction.19 But the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down the injunction as an 
improper regulation of the content of speech, in violation of the First 
Amendment.20 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
                                                 
16
 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-60.  
17




 Id. at 761. 
20
 Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 712 (11th Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1994), and on reh'g en banc, 41 
F.3d 1422 (11th Cir. 1994). 
4
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5 
the Eleventh Circuit and upheld in part and struck down in part the 
injunction.21 
In reviewing the constitutionality of the two provisions of the 
injunction, the Court first had to decide what level of scrutiny applied 
to the injunctions.22 Traditionally, laws limiting protected speech are 
subject to the highest scrutiny—strict scrutiny.23 However, the Court 
carved out an exception for content neutral regulations of time, 
manner, and place of speech.24 Therefore, if a regulation is aimed at 
the time, manner or place of speech, not the content thereof, then it is 
subject to lower scrutiny.25 Conversely, if a regulation limits speech 
based on its content, then it is subject to strict scrutiny.26  
The Court found that both of the provisions of the injunction were 
content neutral.27 Citing to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court 
explained that the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality 
is whether the government adopted a regulation of speech without 
reference to the content of that speech.”28 Here, the Court found that 
because the injunctions do not reference the content of the speech, 
they are content neutral.29 However, the Court recognized that while 
content neutral, these are injunctions, which pose a greater risk of 
censorship than generally applicable laws.30 Therefore, the Court 
applied a more “stringent application” of intermediate scrutiny, asking 
“whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more 
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”31 
                                                 
21
 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757. 
22
 Id. at 763. 
23
 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
24




 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
27
 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. 
28
 Id. at 763 (quotation marks omitted). 
29
 Id. at 762. 
30
 Id. at 764-65. 
31
 Id. at 765. 
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Applying this more "stringent" test, the Court found that the 
thirty-six-foot fixed buffer zone was valid, but the 300-foot bubble 
zone was not.32 The Court found that the thirty-six-foot fixed buffer 
zone did not burden more speech than was necessary because the 
governmental interest—providing safety and accessibility to the 
clinic—justified the limited burden on speech in that limited area.33 
However, the 300-foot no approach zone, in the Court's view, 
burdened speech in too large of an area while pursuing a less 
compelling governmental interest—preventing “clinic patients and 
staff from being stalked or shadowed by the petitioners.”34 Citing to 
Boos v. Barry, the Court explained that “in public debate our own 
citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order 
to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment.”35 
In so holding, the Court constructed the first principles for 
abortion clinic bubble and buffer zones, finding them to be content 
neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. At the same time, the 
Court recognized the importance of unrestricted speech, especially in a 
public forum, thereby justifying the use of a more “stringent” 
application of intermediate scrutiny. The Court also showed that there 
exists a positive relationship between the size of the restriction and the 
governmental interest pursued. Thus, to be valid, the larger the radius, 
the more compelling the interest has to be. Finally, Madsen also drew 
the first line between a permissible limitation of speech—a fixed 
thirty-six-foot buffer zone—and an impermissible one—a 300-foot no 
approach bubble zone. 
 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York 
 
The next abortion buffer zone case to arrive at the Supreme Court 
was Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York which 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 769-70, 773-74. 
33
 Id. at 769-70. 
34
 Id. at 773-74 (quotations omitted). 
35
 Id. at 774 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
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7 
involved another injunction.36 This time the lower court prohibited the 
petitioners, abortion protestors, from approaching within fifteen feet of 
any entrance to an abortion clinic (the buffer zone) and within fifteen 
feet of any patient entering or leaving that clinic (the bubble zone).37 
As the protestors appealed that injunction, the Supreme Court decided 
Madsen, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied 
explicitly on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Madsen to affirm the 
injunction.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.39 
The Court found that the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone around the 
entrance survived constitutional scrutiny, but the fifteen-foot floating 
buffer zone around patients did not.40 The Court began by noting that 
Madsen found similar injunctions to be content neutral and as such, 
the Court did not discuss content neutrality here, but rather launched 
straight into the Madsen intermediate scrutiny analysis.41 The Court 
also noted that the governmental interests at play—public safety, 
unrestricted access to clinics, and free-flow of traffic—are the same as 
in Madsen and thus valid.42 
First, the Court turned to the floating bubble zone, which 
prohibited petitioners from approaching within fifteen feet of the 
clinic's patients.43 The Court noted because this buffer zone floated 
with the patient, it required the protestors to move as the patient 
moved in order to avoid being within the buffer zone.44 The Court also 
found it important that this provision impacted leafletting and 
commenting on matters of public concern, which are the “classic 
                                                 
36
 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
37
 Id. at 367. 
38
 Id. at 370-71. 
39
 Id. at 385. 
40
 Id. at 376-77. 
41
 Id. at 374-85. 
42
 Id. at 376. 
43
 Id. at 377. 
44
 Id. at 377-78. 
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forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment . . . .”45 
The Court concluded that “because this broad prohibition on speech 
‘floats,’ it cannot be sustained on this record.”46 But, the Court also 
noted that it was not deciding “whether the governmental interests 
involved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation between 
individuals entering the clinics and protesters, measured by the 
distance between the two.”47 
Turning to the fixed buffer zone around the entrances to the clinic, 
the Court found that the buffer zone properly regulated time, manner, 
and place of speech, rather than its content.48 The Court upheld the 
buffer zone, noting that the records showed that the protestors often 
intentionally blocked access to the clinic.49 Therefore, the fixed buffer 
zone was squarely aimed at limiting this practice and protecting the 
governmental interest in safe access to the clinic.50 
Schenck affirmed Madsen and provided further guidance on the 
intersection of the First Amendment's freedom of speech and the 
Fourteenth Amendment's fundamental right to access abortion. The 
Court solidified its prior conclusion that buffer and bubble zones are 
content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny (or a “more 
stringent” application thereof). It also reaffirmed that buffer zones, if 
properly tailored, likely survive this level of scrutiny even though the 
First Amendment rights are enhanced in the context of discourse on 
matters of public concern in public forum. And while Schenck struck 
down the floating buffer zone, the Court did not answer the question 
of whether any floating zone can survive constitutional scrutiny. 
 
Hill v. Colorado 
 
                                                 
45
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9 
In 2000 the Court answered that question in the affirmative. 
Building off of its momentum from Madsen and Schenck, the Supreme 
Court returned to abortion clinic bubble zone regulation. This time, in 
Hill v. Colorado, the Court reviewed a Colorado statute that prohibited 
people, within 100-feet of a reproductive health facility, from 
knowingly approaching within eight-feet of a patient of the facility, 
"for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, 
or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with" such a 
patient.51 Abortion protesters challenged the law in state court arguing 
that it is facially invalid, content based regulation aimed at suppressing 
their free speech and press rights.52 The trial court upheld the statute, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme 
Court denied review.53 
While the protestors' petition for writ of certiorari was pending, 
the Court decided Schenck. In light of that decision, the Court granted 
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals, and 
reversed for reconsideration in light of Schenck.54 On remand, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its previous judgment, finding 
that Schenck did not impact its analysis.55 The Colorado Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s finding that the law was a 
permissible regulation of time, manner, and place of speech which 
survived intermediate scrutiny.56 The Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari and affirmed. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began the analysis by 
noting that the protestors clearly have a First Amendment right to free 
speech and the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the 
“health and safety of their citizens.”57 This governmental interest 
justifies regulations that ensure access to healthcare facilities, as well 
                                                 
51
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 707. 
52
 Id. at 709. 
53
 Id. at 711. 
54




 Id. at 712-14. 
57
 Id. at 714-15. 
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as “the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with 
confrontational protests.”58 The government also has a legitimate 
interest in regulations that provide specific guidance for law 
enforcement, thereby promoting equal enforcement.59 And finally, the 
Court noted that there is another interest at play here, that of “[t]he 
unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication,” 
stemming from the “right to be let alone” recognized in Olmstead v. 
United States.60 But, the Court noted that this “right to be let alone” is 
in tension with the First Amendment's “right to persuade.”61 
The Court then moved on to the content neutrality analysis. The 
Court explained that this inquiry asks whether the statute can be 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”62 
Citing Ward, the Court explained that when determining content 
neutrality, the “principal inquiry . . . is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.”63 Applying this test, the Court determined that 
the Colorado statute is content neutral for three reasons.64 First, it is 
not a “regulation of speech,” but merely a regulation of where some 
speech may occur.65 Second, the statute is not motivated by a 
disagreement with any particular message because it applies equally to 
all demonstrators within the specified radius and does not refer to any 
content of the speech.66 Third, the governmental interests pursued by 
this statute—protecting patients' access and privacy and providing 
                                                 
58
 Id. at 715 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. 753).  
59
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-16. 
60
 Id. at 716 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).  
61
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("While the freedom to communicate is substantial, 'the 
right of every person "to be let alone" must be placed in the scales with the right of 
others to communicate.'" quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).  
62
 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
63








Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
11 
clear guidelines to law enforcement—are unrelated to the content of 
the regulated speech.67 
The protestors argued that the law is still content based because 
enforcement of the law will require examination of the content of the 
speech.68 Since the law criminalizes approaching within eight feet of a 
patient, “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest, education, or 
counseling,” law enforcement must necessarily examine the content of 
the speech to determine if one is engaging in “protest, education or 
counseling,” or merely saying something else, such as good morning.69 
The Court rejected this argument as being without merit.70 First, 
without citing any authority, the Court explained that it is common for 
law enforcement to have to examine a statement in order to determine 
if a violation occurred—for example, a statement must be examined to 
decide if it is blackmail, a threat, or a copyright violation.71 Moreover, 
the Court, again without citing any authority, clarified that it has never 
held that “it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written 
statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a 
course of conduct.”72 And finally, the Court noted that in this specific 
context, it is unlikely that any such examination will practically be 
required; rather, it will be obvious who is present outside of an 
abortion clinic “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest, 
education, or counseling.”73 
Since the Court found that the statute is content neutral, 
intermediate scrutiny applies and the law must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest.74 The Court began by 
accounting for the burden imposed by the statute on the three types of 
                                                 
67
 Id. at 719-20. 
68












 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
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regulated speech: signs, oral protest, and leafletting.75 The law 
imposed minimum to no burden on signs displayed by protestors 
because they can be read from eight feet away.76 As for oral protests, 
the Court also found that eight feet is not burdensome because eight 
feet is a “normal conversational distance.”77 However, for leafletting, 
the Court conceded that the law imposed a “more serious” burden, but 
still does not completely foreclose this form of communication. In an 
apparent nod to Schenck, the Court noted that the statute does not 
require someone who is already in the path of an incoming patient to 
get out of the way.78 Thus, such a protestor may stand anywhere within 
the 100-foot radius and may remain stationary even if that means that 
at some point she will be within the eight-foot floating bubble of a 
patient. 79 The statue only prohibits protestors from knowingly 
approaching within eight feet of a patient.80 
Noting the burden of the law, the Court explained that when 
deciding tailoring, context is important because courts recognize 
heightened governmental interest in certain places, such as schools, 
courthouses, polling places, private homes, and healthcare facilities.81 
And since the Colorado statute regulates speech around a healthcare 
facility—a place where the governmental interest is heightened—the 
law is an “exceedingly modest restriction.”82 Thus, the law survives 
constitutional scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant interest.83 
The protestors also argued the law is invalid because it is 
overbroad and vague.84 The law is overbroad because it aims to 
                                                 
75




 Id. at 726-27 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. 357).  
78






 Id. at 728. 
82




 Id. at 730-33. 
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prevent a very specific problem—protests outside of abortion clinics—
but it applies to all healthcare facilities and bans all types of speech.85 
The Court dismissed the first part of the argument on the grounds that 
the statute's far reach to all healthcare facilities is a “virtue, not a 
vice,” because it supports its content neutrality resulting in 
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.86 As to the argument that the 
statute bans too much speech, the Court explained that this is a 
misreading of the law because it does not “ban” any speech; rather it 
regulates certain speech in certain places.87 With regard to vagueness, 
the Court quickly dismissed this concern, holding that “it is clear what 
the ordinance as a whole prohibits.”88 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the Colorado statute, finding it 
to be a content neutral regulation which is narrowly tailored to address 
a significant governmental interest.89 Again, building off of Madsen 
and Schenck, the Court confirmed its view that abortion clinic buffer 
zones are content neutral. Hill also provided some much-needed 
clarification on the tailoring requirement. Thus, while a fifteen-foot 
floating bubble that required protestors to get out of the patient's way 
placed too much burden on speech,90 an eight-foot floating bubble 
zone that did not require protestors to get out of the way did not. 
Likewise, a 300-foot radius is too large, but a 100-foot radius is not.  
 
McCullen v. Oakley 
 
Fourteen years after Hill, the Supreme Court agreed to review 
McCullen v. Oakley, which was another challenge to an abortion clinic 
buffer zone.91 This time, at issue was a Massachusetts law which 
                                                 
85
 Id. at 730. 
86




 Id. at 731-32 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 
(1972)). 
89
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 725, 730. 
90
 See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377. 
91
 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014). 
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created a fixed buffer zones on public walkways within thirty-five feet 
of any entrance to a “reproductive health care facility.”92 A 
reproductive health care facility was defined as “a place, other than 
within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered 
or performed.”93 The law, in effect, made it a crime to stand anywhere 
within thirty-five feet of an abortion clinic during business hours.94 In 
practice, the law lead clinics to paint an arc on the sidewalk outlining 
the thirty-five foot radius.95 The law also exempted four classes of 
people: 1) people entering or leaving the clinic; 2) employees or 
agents, acting within the scope of their employment; 3) law 
enforcement and other emergency services members; and 4) people 
walking on a public sidewalk “solely for the purpose of reaching a 
destination other than such facility.”96 The law was enacted as a means 
to replace the prior regulation which created a six-foot floating bubble 
within eighteen feet of a healthcare facility.97 
The plaintiffs, abortion protestors who call themselves “sidewalk 
counselors,” challenged the new law, arguing that it violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments on its face and as applied.98 After a bench 
trial, the district court denied the plaintiffs' facial challenge, and the 
First Circuit affirmed.99 On remand, the court also denied the as-
applied challenge, and the First Circuit again affirmed.100 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, ultimately striking down the law.101 
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts began by noting that the 
law explicitly applies to anyone who enters or remains on a “public 
                                                 
92
 MASS. GEN. LAWS, CH. 266, § 120E1/2(b) (2012). 
93
 Id. § 120E1/2(a). 
94




 MASS. GEN. LAWS, CH. 266, § 120E1/2(b); see also McCullen, 573 U.S. at 
472. 
97
 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 469-70. 
98




 Id. at 472. 
101
 Id. at 497. 
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15 
way or sidewalk,” a place known as traditional public fora and which 
occupies a special place within the First Amendment jurisprudence.102 
Again, the Court began by determining if the law was content 
based.103 The plaintiffs advanced two arguments for why it was.104 
First, it was content based because it applied only to health care 
facilities that perform abortions, thus it targeted speech related to 
abortions.105 Second, it was content based because by excluding clinic 
employees, the law discriminated based on viewpoint.106 
The Court rejected the first argument because the law is facially 
neutral. Surely, the Court explained, the law “would be content based 
if it required enforcement authorities to examine the content of the 
message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has 
occurred.”107 However, here, no such need exists because violation is 
not based on what is said, but where it is said, or not said at all, since 
the act can be violated by merely standing within the buffer zone 
without speaking.108 
The Court conceded that the law has an inevitable effect of 
limiting abortion-related speech more than any other kind of speech.109 
But, under Ward, the test for content neutrality is whether the law is 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” not 
whether it burdens one type of speech more than another.110 And here, 
the legislature's intent was to create a new law that would more 
effectively promote public safety around abortion clinics, an interest 
that the Court previously found to be content neutral.111 However, 
                                                 
102
 Id. at 476. 
103
 Id. at 477, 485. 
104






 Id. at 479 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 
383 (1984)).  
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 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479-80. 
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 Id. at 480. 
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 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
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Justice Roberts noted that the law would not be content neutral if “it 
were concerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct 
impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to 
speech.’”112 Finally the Court explained that it will not find an ill-
motive for the law because the law applies to abortion clinics only. 113 
The State was merely responding to the problem it observed—
crowding and obstruction of access to abortion clinics—and no similar 
problem existed with regard to other healthcare facilities in the 
State.114 
The Court also rejected the second argument, that the law is 
content based because it exempts employees.115 The plaintiffs argued 
that by exempting employees, the law allows employees—who will 
likely speak favorably of abortion—to speak within the buffer zone, 
while it prohibits others—who will likely speak against abortion—
from speaking in the same place.116 Thus, in effect, the law 
discriminates based on abortion viewpoint.117 The court rejected this 
argument, viewing the employee exception as reasonable and logical 
to ensure smooth operation of the clinic.118 Indeed, because the 
exemption applies only to employees who are acting in the scope of 
their employment, it suggests that this is merely an exemption 
necessary for the day-to-day operations of the facility, rather than an 
insidious carve out to promote one side of a public debate.119 As such, 
the Court found the law to be a content neutral regulation of the time, 
manner, and place of speech. 
However, the Court struck down the law for not being narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.120 The Court 




 Id. at 481. 
114
 Id. at 482. 
115
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agreed that the State has a valid interest in promoting “public safety, 
patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public 
sidewalks and roadways.”121 And while the law served those interests, 
it also imposed significant burdens on the plaintiffs who wished to 
engage in sidewalk counseling, including one-on-one conversations 
and leafletting, activities which are fundamental to the First 
Amendment.122 
Weighing the State's interests in ensuring public safety and access 
to abortion clinics against the significant burden imposed on plaintiffs’ 
protected speech, the Court concluded that the law burdens more 
speech than necessary.123 First, while other states and municipalities 
regulate access to health care facilities (for example Colorado), no 
other jurisdiction has a statute creating a hard, fixed buffer zone 
around the clinic.124 This means that the State has forgone other, less 
restrictive alternatives.125 Second, the law was redundant because 
another provision of the same act already criminalized obstruction of 
access to a healthcare clinic, and other state laws regulated public 
access to clinics.126 Third, the Court noted that it prefers direct 
injunctions against protestors who actually obstruct access over a 
blanket exclusionary buffer zone that impacts even the peaceful 
protestors.127 Fourth, while the record shows that the State was 
concerned with protecting access to abortion clinics, access was only 
restricted or obstructed at one clinic, and only on Saturday mornings, 
but the law applied to all clinics, at all times.128 
                                                 
121
 Id. at 486. 
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 Id. at 487-89. 
123
 Id. at 490. 
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Returning to this subject after fourteen years, the Supreme Court 
again signaled that abortion clinic buffer zones are content neutral. But 
McCullen added two significant holdings. First, Justice Roberts 
explained that the law would be content based if the content of the 
speech had to be examined to determine a violation of the law. Second, 
the law would also be content based if it were concerned with the 
effect of the speech on its listeners. Both points undermine Hill which 
dismissed the concern over the need to examine content as being of no 
consequence and which assumed that protecting listeners from 
unwanted speech was a valid governmental interest. Additionally, 
McCullen also signaled that buffer zones created by generally 
applicable laws, as opposed to injunctions, are disfavored and usually 
a result of forgoing other, less restrictive alternatives. 
 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert 
 
The last case pertinent to this discussion, although not explicitly 
related to buffer or bubble zones, is a 2015 decision striking down a 
local ordinance that classified signs in Gilbert, Arizona.129 In 2005, the 
town of Gilbert adopted the Sign Code (the "Code"), which classified 
signs that were allowed to be displayed in the city into different 
categories, based on the information they conveyed, and applied 
varying restrictions to each category.130 Three specific categories were 
at issue in Reed: ideological signs, political signs, and temporary 
directional signs.131 Ideological signs were defined as signs for 
noncommercial purpose and were subject to the least restrictions.132 
Political signs were defined as signs designed to influence an election 
and were subject to more restrictions than ideological signs.133 And 
temporary directional signs, which were defined as signs directing 
                                                 
129
 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).  
130
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people to an event, were subject to the most restrictions.134 Plaintiff, a 
local church pastor, posted signs directing people to his Sunday church 
service, but after the Code was enacted, his signs were not in 
compliance with the restrictions imposed on temporary directional 
signs.135 Plaintiff sued, alleging that the Code violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.136 The trial court denied the challenge and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that under Hill, the Code is content 
neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest.137 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Code was content 
based and failed strict scrutiny.138 The Court began by noting that there 
are three types of content based laws.139 First, there are the facially 
content based laws, which define speech based on its content.140 
Second, there are the more subtle laws, which define speech by its 
function or purpose.141 Finally, there is also a third category of content 
based laws which arises out of Ward.142 These are facially content 
neutral laws that cannot be justified without reference to the content of 
the speech.143 Proper content neutrality analysis, as Justice Thomas 
explained, tests the law at issue under all three categories.144 Applying 
the test to the Code, the Court found it to be content based on its face 
because it classified the signs based on the information conveyed.145 
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135




 Id. at 2226. 
138
 Id. at 2231-32. 
139














Zanczak: Piercing the Bubble: Why Bubble Zone Regulations are Content Base
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
20 
The Court next explained how the Ninth Circuit erred in finding 
that the Code was content neutral.146 First, the lower court found the 
law to be content neutral because it can be justified without reference 
to its content.147 But this is not important here because the law is 
content based on its face.148 The Court explained that applying the 
Ward test for content neutrality skips the first two steps in the analysis: 
determining if the law is content based on its face or by its function.149 
The Ward test only applies in the third category of regulation, where 
the law is not content based on its face and does not regulate speech 
based on its function or purpose.150 Here, the Code is content based on 
its face, thus there is no need to even apply the Ward content neutrality 
test.151 
The Ninth Circuit also found that the law was content neutral 
because it did not single out any one idea for favorable treatment.152 
But, the Court explained, this rationale confuses two First Amendment 
prohibitions.153 The First Amendment prohibits viewpoint 
discrimination as well as subject matter discrimination.154 Therefore, 
strict scrutiny is triggered when a law discriminates among viewpoints 
or subject matters.155 Here, while the law did not single out any one 
viewpoint, it regulated an entire subject matter.156  
Having determined that the Code was content based, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny, which requires that the law be narrowly tailored 
to meet a compelling governmental interest.157 The town of Gilbert 










 Id. at 2228-29. 
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presented two interests it was pursuing: preserving the town's aesthetic 
appeal and traffic safety.158 Without commenting on whether these 
interests are compelling, the Court concluded that the Code fails strict 
scrutiny because it is underinclusive.159 This is because directional 
signs—which are burdened with the most restrictive regulations—are 
no more of an eye sore or pose any greater traffic safety concerns than 
ideological or political signs, both of which are subject to lesser 
restrictions.160 
Reed provides the last piece of the puzzle. While the context is 
different in Reed than in the other abortion clinic bubble and buffer 
zone cases, Reed clarified the Ward content based analysis. 
Specifically, the Court explained that there are three separate types of 
content based regulation, and the law at issue must be evaluated under 
each of the three types.161 In prior cases the Court only focused on 
Ward's “justified without reference to the content” type. But Reed 
makes clear that this is only one of the three possible types of content 
based regulation, and failure to test the law under the other two types 
is fatal to the analysis.  
 
Price v. City of Chicago 
 
In 2009, the City of Chicago passed an ordinance creating a fifty-
foot radius around the entrance of a hospital, medical clinic, or 
healthcare facility.162 Within that radius, people are prohibited from 
approaching within eight feet of another person, without consent, “for 
the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or 
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.” (the “Chicago 
Ordinance”).163 The Chicago Ordinance mirrored the Colorado statute 
upheld in Hill, except that the latter applied within a 100-foot radius of 
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a facility, whereas the former applies to a narrower, fifty-foot radius.164 
In 2016, Veronica Price, and other pro-life “sidewalk counselors,” 
sued the City of Chicago challenging the Chicago Ordinance.165 The 
four-count complaint alleged that the Chicago Ordinance: (1) violated 
the First Amendment, facially and as applied, by improperly restricting 
their protected speech; (2) was unconstitutionally vague, in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) was 
selectively enforced in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) improperly infringed the petitioners' 
state rights to free speech and assembly.166 The City moved to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, which, relying on 
Hill, the District Court granted as to the First Amendment and 
vagueness claims, but denied as to the as applied challenge under the 
First Amendment, the selective enforcement claim, and the state law 
claims.167 The parties jointly moved to dismiss the remaining claims, 
allowing Price to appeal the ruling on the facial challenge.168 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal.169 The 
court explained that because the Ordinance mirrored, and indeed was 
narrower than, the statute upheld in Hill, it was bound by the Court's 
precedent.170 However, the Seventh Circuit noted that while the law 
must be upheld under Hill, in the nineteen years since that decision, 
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, specifically, McCullen and 
Reed, significantly eroded the basic assumptions and conclusions in 
Hill.171 And although the court affirmed the dismissal, it went on to 
explain why Hill is of questionable authority.172 
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 Price, 915 F.3d at1110.  
165
 Id. at 1109. 
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TENSION BETWEEN HILL, MCCULLEN, AND REED 
 
Judge Sykes, of the Seventh Circuit, began the analysis in Price v. 
City of Chicago by noting the force of the First Amendment in public 
fora.173 Borrowing the phrase from Justice Roberts, the court noted 
that public places such as sidewalks and walkways “occupy a special 
position in terms of First Amendment protection because of their 
historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”174 Therefore, Price and 
other sidewalk counselors engage in counseling in the place where 
their First Amendment rights have the strongest protections.175 
Rounding out its introduction, the court remarked that content based 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny, but regulations of time, manner, and 
place of speech are evaluated under intermediate scrutiny.176 But, to 
date, abortion clinic buffer and bubble zones have only been evaluated 
under intermediate scrutiny.177 
Next, the court turned to the evolution of abortion clinic buffer 
and bubble zone jurisprudence.178 The court noted that buffer and 
bubble zone regulations have been consistently held to be content 
neutral.179 But the court noted that not all such regulations survived 
constitutional scrutiny; Madsen struck down the 300-foot buffer zone 
and Schenck struck down the fifteen-foot bubble zone.180 The Seventh 
Circuit also noted that Schenck left open the question of “whether the 
governmental interests involved would ever justify some sort of zone 
of separation between individuals entering the clinics and protesters, 
measured by the distance between the two.” 
                                                 
173
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Judge Sykes next reviewed Hill, McCullen, and Reed, providing a 
detailed examination of each decision, before contrasting them.181 This 
is where the Seventh Circuit laid out the evolution of abortion clinic 
bubble and buffer zone jurisprudence and the eventual erosion of 
Hill.182 First, the court noted that Hill began its content neutrality 
analysis by asking if the government enacted the regulation because of 
a disagreement with the message conveyed.183 But, as the Seventh 
Circuit pointed out, Reed explained that the first step of the content 
neutrality test requires testing the statute for content neutrality on its 
face.184 Indeed, in Reed, Justice Thomas took the time to specifically 
explain the three types of content based laws (facially obvious, subtle, 
or unjustifiable without refence to content) and in no uncertain terms 
clarified that courts need to test for each type before concluding that a 
law is content neutral.185 Hill merely tested for the third type—
whether the law can be justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech. Finding that the law can be so justified, the Court 
found it to be content neutral.186 
The Seventh Circuit also pointed out that Hill did not completely 
ignore the statute on its face; rather, it concluded that the statute was 
content neutral because it did not discriminate based on viewpoint or 
subject matter, and the Court was not concerned about law 
enforcement having to evaluate content of speech to determine 
violations.187 But as the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, McCullen and 
Reed explicitly contradict both of those points.188 McCullen explained 
that a law would be content based if law enforcement had to examine 
the content of the message conveyed in order to determine if a 
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violation occurred.189 And Reed explained that the fact that a law does 
not discriminate based on viewpoint or subject matter does not absolve 
an otherwise facially content based law from strict scrutiny.190  
Judge Sykes then focused on the second category of content based 
laws described in Reed.191 These are the subtle content based 
regulations where the law focuses on the function or purpose of the 
speech rather than its content.192 And Judge Sykes pointed out that the 
regulation in Hill, as well as the Chicago Ordinance, cannot survive 
this test because the plain text of each focuses on speech undertaken 
“for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign 
to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.”193 Moreover, 
not only do these laws fall directly under Reed's subtle category of 
content based regulation, they also require evaluation of the content of 
the speech to determine if a violation occurred.194 And as McCullen 
explained, examining the content of the speech to determine if a 
violation occurred means that a law is content based.195 
The Seventh Circuit next evaluated the governmental interest 
stated in Hill.196 In Hill, the Court upheld the law partly because it 
agreed that “protecting listeners from unwanted communication” and 
protecting the right to be “let alone,” are valid governmental 
interests.197 Yet, in McCullen, Justice Roberts noted that the law would 
be content based if “it were concerned with undesirable effects that 
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arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ 
reactions to speech.’”198 
Lastly, Judge Sykes noted yet another point of tension. In Hill, 
Colorado argued that one of its compelling governmental interests was 
providing regulation that will be easy to enforce.199 In upholding the 
bubble zone regulation, the Court approved that interest, explaining 
that laws that offer clear guidance to law enforcement promote equal 
enforcement of the law.200 Indeed, Hill stated that a “brightline 
prophylactic rule may be the best way to provide protection, and, at 
the same time, by offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to 
protect speech itself.”201 This is in stark contrast with McCullen's 
explanation that a “painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but 
the prime objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”202 
Recognizing that it is bound by Hill, the Seventh Circuit 
grudgingly affirmed the Chicago Ordinance as a content neutral 
regulation of time, manner, and place of speech that is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest. But in its 
analysis, the court provided an avenue for the Supreme Court to clarify 
the validity of Hill post McCullen and Reed. Or perhaps even created a 
vehicle for the Court to overrule Hill and clarify the proper test for 
abortion clinic bubble and buffer zones—which on their face are 
content based. 
 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FIND THAT ABORTION CLINIC BUBBLE 
AND BUFFER ZONES ARE CONTENT BASED REGULATIONS SUBJECT TO 
STRICT SCRUTINY 
 
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the tension between Hill 
and the Court's subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence in 
McCullen and Reed. Tension, that when properly explored, 
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undermines the Court's reasoning in Hill, and properly questions the 
current precedent which holds that abortion bubble and buffer zone are 
content neutral regulations. From Madsen until McCullen, the Court 
had gone to great lengths to find those laws to be content neutral, 
when in fact, they are anything but that. The Court maintained its 
consistency in the context of abortion clinic bubble zones. But the 
Court's decision in Reed undermines the basic rationale that led the 
Court to deem the bubble zone regulation to be content neutral in the 
first place. Whether intentional or not, Reed clarified the Ward 
framework, eroding the very foundation of Madsen, Schenck, Hill, and 
McCullen. The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the tension between Reed, 
McCullen, and Hill recognizes the correct test to be applied when 
determining the content neutrality of a statute. The statute should be 
tested for content neutrality by asking if it: 1) discriminates based on 
content on its face; 2) discriminates based on the function or purpose 
of speech; and 3) can be justified without reference to the content of 
the speech. Applying this correct test to abortion clinic buffer and 
bubble zone regulations should result in finding that those regulations 
are content based and thus subject to strict scrutiny.  
 
Abortion Clinic Bubble Zone Laws Are Content Based 
 
Although Madsen, and its progeny, hold that abortion clinic 
bubble and buffer zones are content neutral, this conclusion is wrong. 
For starters, the law in Hill was plainly content based. The law 
prohibited approaching a patient of a healthcare facility, if the 
approach is “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest, education, 
or counseling . . . .”203 As the Seventh Circuit noted, by regulating 
speech defined by its function or purpose, such laws fall squarely 
under the subtle content based regulation defined in Reed.204 To be 
sure, the Colorado legislature specifically avoided any reference to the 
topic of abortion, and instead drafted a broad prohibition on speech 
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outside of healthcare facilities generally.205 But, as the majority in Hill 
correctly noted, the law was motivated by protests outside of abortion 
clinics.206 The legislative history is especially telling.207 The law’s 
sponsor introduced it by saying that “all Colorado women have the 
right to reproductive choice . . . [but] anti-abortion groups are 
picketing women's health clinics across the state and are trying to 
intimidate or physically block all people's entry into these clinics . . . 
.”208 And when the bill was signed into law, the sponsor referred to the 
law as “the only significant pro-choice bill to pass in Colorado since 
1967.”209  
Furthermore, the law is also content based on its face. The 
preamble to the law states, in part, that “the exercise of a person's right 
to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be 
balanced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling 
and treatment in an unobstructed manner . . . .”210 As Justice Scalia 
argued in his dissent, “[t]he word ‘against’ reveals the legislature's 
desire to restrict discourse on one side of the issue regarding ‘certain 
medical procedures.’”211 Yet, the majority concluded that the law was 
content neutral. Despite legislative history, which indicates that the 
only driving force behind this statue was concern over protests outside 
of abortion clinics, and the very text of the statute, which expressed 
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concern over the discourse on only one side of the issue, the Court 
found the law to be content neutral. 
As the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, the Court’s content 
neutrality analysis was flawed. The Court only asked whether the law 
can be justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.212 But, this is only part of the inquiry. The majority in Hill 
cited to Ward for its content neutrality test. The Court in Ward upheld a 
New York City regulation which limited amplified sound from one of 
the city’s public venues.213 The Court noted that the regulation has 
nothing to do with content and that “[t]he principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, 
place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.”214 A decade later, Hill relied on this statement in 
Ward in conducting its content neutrality analysis. However, what 
Ward described as the principal inquiry in deciding content neutrality, 
the Court in Hill took as the only inquiry.  
Similarly, other abortion clinic buffer and bubble zone regulations 
are also content based. For example, in McCullen, although the Court 
concluded that the law was content neutral, the law on its face appears 
to be content based. First of all, the Act was entitled, “Protesting and 
Educating in the Vicinity of Reproductive Health Care Facilities 
Restricted.”215 The title alone gives away the clear goal and purpose of 
the law—to regulate protesting and educating outside of abortion 
clinics. The Act defined “reproductive health care facilities” as “a 
place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where 
abortions are offered or performed,” otherwise known as an abortion 
clinic.216 No one could seriously argue that there are any protests 
outside of abortion clinics that are not related to the topic of abortion. 
                                                 
212
 Id. at 719; Price, 915 F.3d at 1117. 
213
 Ward, 491 U.S. at 803.  
214
 Id. at 791. 
215
 MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 266, § 120E1/2(b) (West 2007). 
216
 Id. § 120E1/2(a). 
29
Zanczak: Piercing the Bubble: Why Bubble Zone Regulations are Content Base
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
30 
Thus, the title of the Act alone shows its focus on the content of the 
speech. 
Additionally, the law applied only during the clinic’s business 
hours, further illustrating that the legislature was not concerned with 
content neutral goals such as regulating noise, but rather sought to 
stymie anti-abortion protestors. That goal is anything but content 
neutral, meaning that the law created to pursue that goal, the buffer 
zone, is also anything but content neutral. 
The Chicago Ordinance at issue in Price suffers the same fatal 
flaw. The law was styled after Hill, which after applying the correct 
analysis, is content based. The Chicago Ordinance is also content 
based because it defines speech based on its purpose and function. 
Like the Colorado statute, the Chicago Ordinance prohibits 
approaching within eight feet of a patient of an abortion clinic “for the 
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or 
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.”217 Again, under the 
clarified test from Reed, a law that regulates speech based on its 
function or purpose is content based.218 The Chicago Ordinance 
explicitly targets speech undertaken for a specific “purpose,” and is 
therefore content based. 
 
The Court Correctly Recognized Content Based Regulation in Other 
Contexts 
 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to find that abortion clinic buffer 
and bubble zones are content based is a notable deviation from its 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. In other contexts, the 
Court has been rather critical of plainly content based regulation. In R. 
A. V. v. St. Paul, the Court struck down a municipal law prohibiting 
certain acts and symbols which are known to “arouse[] anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.”219 The Court unanimously concluded that such a law, while 
                                                 
217
 CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-010(j)(1) (emphasis added).  
218
 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
219
 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992). 
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well meaning, is an impermissible content based restriction.220 
Beginning its content based analysis with looking at the face of the 
statute, the Court found that the statute is content based on its face 
because it prohibits only those fighting words that arouse anger “on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” while allowing 
fighting words that arouse anger on some other basis.221 The Court 
explained that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit [imposing] 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects.”222 But the Court went even further, noting that 
this regulation discriminates not only based on content, but also based 
on viewpoint.223 That is because the law would permit those arguing 
for race equality to use fighting words, while prohibiting those arguing 
against it from using the same fighting words.224 The Court concluded 
that “[the government] has no such authority to license one side of a 
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensberry rules.”225 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court found that a Vermont 
statute prohibiting pharmaceutical sales representatives from using a 
physician’s prescription history for marketing purposes was a content 
based regulation.226 Here, the Court also began its analysis by looking 
at the face of the statute and found it to be content based because it 
                                                 
220







224 Id. at 391-92 (“In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even 
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays 
containing some words -- odious racial epithets, for example -- would be prohibited 
to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that do not themselves invoke race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender -- aspersions upon a person's mother, for example -- 
would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of 
racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ 
opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic 
bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and 




 564 U.S. 552, 563-64 (2011).  
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prohibited use of a certain kind of speech (a physician’ prescription 
history) for a specific purpose (marketing), while allowing the use of 
the same speech for other purposes.227 The Court also found that the 
statute discriminated based on a speaker’s identity because it only 
prohibited pharmaceutical sales representatives from using this kind of 
speech, while everyone else was allowed to use it.228 Therefore, 
because the law, on its face, targeted speech taken for a certain 
purpose—marketing—the statute was content based. 229 The Court also 
looked to legislative history to bolster its conclusion, noting that 
“[f]ormal legislative findings accompanying [the statute] confirm that 
the law's express purpose and practical effect are to diminish the 
effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”230  
Likewise, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the 
Court concluded, albeit in a much more contested manner than R. A. 
V., splitting 5-4, that a regulation which required adult content to be 
scrambled or aired during certain, limited hours, is an improper 
content based regulation.231 The Court concluded that because the 
regulation’s primary concern is the effect of adult material on youth, 
its justification is explicitly tied to its content and the therefore the law 
is content based.232 The Court recognized the government’s concern 
over youth having access to adult material on television.233 However, 
the Court explained that, “[w]here the designed benefit of a content 
based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the 
general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less 
restrictive alternative exists.”234 In no unequivocal terms, the Court 
explained that the First Amendment’s prohibition on content based 
discrimination trumps the government’s concern over the impact of 








 Id. at 564-65. 
231
 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).  
232
 Id. at 811.  
233
 Id. at 813-14. 
234
 Id. at 813. 
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that content on the listener. 235 Indeed, few people would disagree with 
the policy that youth should be shielded from adult content, yet the 
Court explained that the effect of the speech will not transform a 
plainly content based regulation into a content neutral one. 236 Notably, 
the Court decided Playboy a month before Hill, and Justice Stevens, 
who authored the majority opinion in Hill, joined the majority in 
Playboy, indicating that he thought this analysis was correct. Yet, a 
month later, the Court did not follow its own analysis.  
And finally, most recently, in Reed, the Court did not hesitate to 
call a law regulating use of signs content based on its face.237 As 
explained above, the Court began its analysis with the text of the 
statute and concluded that the law is content based because it defined 
the regulated signs based on the content of the information the sign 
conveys.238 The Court then explained that a “law . . . is content based 
on its face . . . regardless of the government’s benign motive, content 
neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in 
the regulated speech.”239 
The Court has never before hesitated to call a law which regulates 
speech based on its content, exactly what it is—a content based 
regulation. Despite the morally right purpose that the law may serve, 
such as the anti-racially and religiously charged hate speech in R. A. V., 
or the desire to protect youth from pornographic materials in Playboy, 
the Court adhered to its analytical framework. That framework is to 
first look at the text of the statute to determine if the law discriminates 
based on the content of speech. If the government seeks to root out 
some evil, vile, or plain wrong conduct, but does so only for a limited 
group of people because of its disagreement with that group’s 
viewpoint, the regulation is content based.240 This was true in R. A. V.  










 Id. at 2228. 
240
 And such regulation is likely also view-point based. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
391. 
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where the government prohibited the use of symbols or acts meant to 
invoke anger based on race or religion, a righteous goal, but allowed 
use of the same symbols or acts to invoke anger that is based in some 
reason other than race or religion.  
A similar problem appeared in Sorrell. The State wanted to 
prevent pharmaceutical companies from directly targeting physicians 
which could undermine their medical decisions. To achieve this 
righteous goal, the state prohibited a certain class of speakers—
pharmaceuticals sales representatives—from using certain speech for a 
specific purpose—prescription history for the purpose of marketing. 
By focusing on the intent of the speaker, the State targeted a sub-part 
of the entire class of speakers and imposed a burden on that group. 
Just as in R. A. V., the regulation in Sorrell was content based on its 
face and the Court did not have a hard time reaching that conclusion. 
R. A. V. was a unanimous decision, and in Sorrell, the three dissenters 
did not raise issue with the Court’s content based analysis.241  
Likewise, in Playboy, the government wished to protect youth 
from adult video content, again a righteous goal, by requiring those 
that primarily stream such content to either scramble their signal or 
limit it to overnight only. Congress sought to achieve this goal by 
targeting specific content—sexually oriented programming—and a 
specific class of speakers—those that primarily distribute such 
content. And again, the Court correctly found that regulating certain 
speech based on its content makes the law content based. The same 
conclusion appears in Reed. The Court did not quibble about whether a 
statute that separates signs into categories based only on the message it 
conveys is a content based regulation. In a unanimous decision, the 
Court concluded, “[o]n its face, the Sign Code is a content based 
regulation of speech. We thus have no need to consider the 
government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to 
determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”242 
                                                 
241
 Rather, they argued that regulation should be subjected to lesser scrutiny as 
it affects commercial speech only. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting). 
242
 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
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These four cases illustrate a common principle: the Court knows 
how to determine if a regulation is content based. That determination 
starts with the text. If a regulation defines the speech by the message 
conveyed, like in Reed or Playboy, the Court will find it content based 
on its face. However, the law does not need to be as explicitly content 
based in order to receive strict scrutiny, because the Court will also 
look to the purpose or function of that speech. And just like in Sorrell 
and R. A. V., where the regulation prohibited speech taken for a 
specific purpose, such as marketing or invoking racially- or 
religiously-based anger, the Court will also find it to be content based. 
Finally, the Court will also look to the legislative history and purpose 
of the law. This played an especially important role in Sorrell, where 
the Court found content bias in the text, but still looked to legislative 
history and found specific language from the legislature showing 
intent to discriminate against one subgroup—pharmaceutical 
marketers.  
This analytical framework guides the Court in determining 
whether a statute is content neutral. This is true regardless of how 
righteous or morally correct the purpose of the law is. Whether it’s 
preventing hate crime, shielding youth from obscene content, or 
ensuring the best medical care, the law will still be content based. 
Meaning, the purpose or justification for the law has no bearing on 
whether it is content based. To be sure, the law’s purpose or 
justification is of great importance when deciding if the law survives 
the required scrutiny. But the law’s purpose plays no role in deciding 
which level of scrutiny applies. 
 
Hill’s Analysis Was Outcome Driven 
 
The reason why the Court in Hill departed from its traditional 
content neutrality analysis lies in the context of abortion clinic buffer 
and bubble zone laws. Those laws impact the ability of abortion 
protestors to express their view on abortion. A view that runs contrary 
to the current laws in the United States, which recognize a 
fundamental right in access to abortion. Therefore, because of the 
35
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sensitive nature of the underlying debate—whether abortions should 
be allowed or not—the Court appears to have applied an altered 
content neutrality analysis to the plainly content based laws. This then 
allowed the Court to find those laws to be content neutral and thus 
subject to lower scrutiny, ensuring that at least some portions of those 
laws survive. And this is exactly what Justice Scalia called out in his 
dissent in Hill, stating, 
 
None of these remarkable conclusions should come as a 
surprise. What is before us, after all, is a speech regulation 
directed against the opponents of abortion, and it therefore 
enjoys the benefit of the “ad hoc nullification machine” that 
the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines 
of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored 
practice.243 
 
Justice Scalia referred to anti-abortion protesting as a “highly favored 
practice” and accused the majority of creating the “ad hoc nullification 
machine,” which allows the Court to uphold laws which limit this 
“favored practice.” Put otherwise, Justice Scalia accused the majority 
of creating a different constitutional test that is applied only to 
regulations that limit the ability of people to protest against abortions. 
Soon after the decision was published, scholars recognized that Hill’s 
content neutrality analysis was modified, and indeed flawed.244 
                                                 
243
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
244
 See David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment 
and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 993 n.361 (2001) 
 
The dissents in Hill appear to have it right. The majority’s first 
supposed reason for treating the Colorado statute as content neutral 
is so patently inadequate as to call into question the majority’s 
entire treatment of the issue . . . The majority’s test really only 
determines whether the statute is a “place” regulation (and thus a 
“time, place, or manner” regulation); just because it is does not 
mean that it cannot be content based. The majority’s test would be 
an adequate reason for inferring content neutrality only if a law’s 
36
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The critics of Hill’s content neutrality analysis largely agree that 
Colorado’s statute was content based. First, the law’s preamble on its 
face singled out specific speech—protest against certain medical 
procedures (read: abortions). Yet the Court found it to be content 
neutral. The law also explicitly described the regulated speech in terms 
of its purpose and function, prohibiting only that speech which is taken 
for the purpose of “oral protest, education, or counseling.” Yet the 
Court found it to be content neutral. Then, the Court merely 
disregarded the legislative history, despite its precedent which requires 
the Court to look to legislative history to determine proper intent even 
if the statue is content neutral on its face.245 Had the Court engaged in 
                                                                                                                   
content neutrality and its being a time-place-manner regulation 
were equivalent. But, as the dissent properly notes, they are not. 
 
Second, even if Colorado's statute was not adopted because of 
disagreement with the message of abortion protesters, 
disagreement with the expression of that message to women about 
to undergo abortions clearly undergirds the statute. Even if the 
Colorado Supreme Court's holding that the statute applies to "all 
demonstrators" is taken not to raise any due process concerns 
despite the statute's being addressed only to "oral protest, 
education, or counseling," it still skews the expressive landscape 
(or lawscape) with respect to abortion: A person who wishes to 
escort a woman into a clinic in order to support her decision to 
have an abortion would not be a "demonstrator," and it is 
implausible that police would be equipped to prosecute any clinic 
escorts who might utter reassurances to a woman that technically 
might fall within the statute's definition of "counseling." A person 
who wishes to dissuade a woman from having an abortion, on the 
other hand, is forbidden to approach to "counsel" without 
permission. 
 
Third, the majority essentially reduced the content neutrality 
inquiry solely to the question whether the challenged regulation is 
related to the suppression or content of expression, over the 




 Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 534 (1993) (holding that, under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, 
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a proper statutory interpretation of the Colorado law, it would have 
quickly found ill-intent.  
The legislative history is riddled with hints of bias against 
abortion protestors.246 To be fair, the Court did not just completely 
refuse to discuss legislative history. In fact, the majority noted that 
“the legislative history makes it clear that its enactment was primarily 
motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”247 Indeed, 
the law’s sponsor referred to it as a “the only significant pro-choice 
bill to pass in Colorado since 1967.”248 Yet, the Court found it to be 
content neutral, refusing to read this motive as giving the statute an 
improper purpose. Finally, looking past the statutory text and 
legislative history, above all, the Court reduced the content neutrality 
to one singular inquiry: whether the challenged regulation is related to 
the suppression or content of expression.249 But, as the dissent 
correctly pointed out, while this is the “the principal inquiry . . . it is 
not the only inquiry.”250 Still, the majority, relying on Schenck and 
Madsen, which dealt with injunctions rather than statutes, folded the 
entire content neutrality analysis into this one inquiry. An inquiry, 
which after Reed, we know is incomplete. Simply put, Hill’s content 
based analysis marks a significant departure from the Court’s 
traditional content based analysis. The reason for this appears to be 
that the majority’s reasoning was outcome driven: the Court wanted to 
ensure that the laws limiting speech outside of abortion clinics survive, 
thus the Court went to great length to call it content neutral and subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.  
 
                                                                                                                   
the Court could look beyond a law's facial neutrality to examine the discriminatory 
purpose of the law). 
246
 For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history, see Chen, supra note 
205 at 51-55. 
247
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 715. 
248
 Abortion Clinic "Bubble" Bill Signed, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 20, 1993, at B4. 
249
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); see also Cruz, supra 
note 244 at 993 n.361. 
250
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).  
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The Future of Abortion Clinic Buffer and Bubble Zones 
 
The Court does not need to go through the legal gymnastics 
required to squeeze the abortion clinic bubble and buffer zone laws 
into intermediate scrutiny. While it is less demanding than strict 
scrutiny, abortion clinic buffer and bubble zones likely can survive 
strict scrutiny. Narrow tailoring is beyond the scope of this article, but 
if the Court properly recognizes those laws to be content based, then 
those laws would need to be narrowly tailored toward a compelling 
governmental interest, rather than a significant interest required under 
intermediate scrutiny. And the Court has provided enough guidance to 
shed some light on this question. Albeit writing in the context of 
intermediate scrutiny, the Court has signaled that the greater the 
interest pursued by these bubble and buffer zones, the greater physical 
distance that Court is willing to uphold. 
To understand the tailoring implications, it makes most sense to 
discuss bubble zones separately from buffer zones. Looking at bubble 
zones, in Madsen, the Court struck down the prohibition on 
approaching patients that are within 300 feet of a clinic. 251 The 
injunction in that case actually did not prohibit approaching within 
certain number of feet, but generally prohibited “physically 
approaching” patients.252 Had the law survived, a better definition of 
approach would be needed, but for purposes of this discussion we will 
assume that “physically approaching” meant approaching from a 
distance greater than eight feet, perhaps merely taking some steps 
toward that patient from as far away as ten or fifteen feet.253 Under 
                                                 
251
 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70, 773-74. 
252
 Id. at 760-61. 
253
 This is a reasonable assumption given that the Court in Hill upheld an 
eight-foot bubble zone, but in Schenck, the Court explicitly left open the question of 
whether any distance between the patient and the protestor can survive constitutional 
scrutiny. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, it is reasonable to assume 
that in Madsen, which came before Schenck and Hill, “approaching” could have 
included merely taking steps toward the patient from a distance beyond eight feet. If 
it were eight feet, or smaller, then we already know that this would likely survive.  
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such definition, we know that this law would fail strict scrutiny since it 
failed intermediate scrutiny in Madsen.  
Next, in Schenck, the Court dealt with a more precise injunction, 
which prohibited approaching within fifteen feet of a patient.254 Like 
in Madsen, this bubble zone was struck down as not being narrowly 
tailored. But, at the same time, the Court upheld a fifteen-foot buffer 
zone around the clinic’s entrance.255 This signals that the Court will 
require a closer fit, or a small radius, for bubble zones, than buffer 
zones. And since the Court in Hill thought that an eight-foot bubble 
survived intermediate scrutiny, it logically follows that to survive the 
heightened requirement of strict scrutiny, the law will likely need to be 
slightly more closely tailored. Finally, the Court left yet another clue 
for the tailoring task, noting that a floating bubble that requires people 
to get out of the way, as was the case in Schenck, is more restrictive 
than a floating bubble that allows protestors to remain stationary, as 
was the case in Hill.256  
Thus, we have a sliding scale. A general restriction on “physically 
approaching” is not narrowly tailored. Neither is a fifteen-foot floating 
bubble. But an eight-foot bubble that allows a person to remain 
stationary is narrowly tailored. Now, this sliding scale exists under 
intermediate scrutiny, meaning that the Court thought eight feet was 
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest. If the 
Court properly recognizes bubble and buffer zones as content based, 
then the required interest would have to be compelling, rather than 
significant. 
There exists a serious question as to whether the Court will accept 
the same interests that the Court previously found significant—
ensuring access and preventing patients and staff from being “stalked 
or shadowed”257—as also being compelling. Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit correctly pointed out that some of the interests that the Hill 
Court relied on—"protecting listeners from unwanted communication" 
                                                 
254
 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 367. 
255
 Id. at 376-77. 
256
 Hill, 530 U.S. at 727. 
257
 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773-74 (internal quotations omitted)  
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and protecting the right to be "let alone"—are not likely to be found 
valid after McCullen. 258 But, even if they are found to be valid, 
because of the more exacting nature of strict scrutiny, the distance 
upheld under intermediate scrutiny will probably need to be adjusted. 
Therefore, while an eight-foot bubble may be narrowly tailored to 
pursue a significant governmental interest (intermediate scrutiny), the 
distance may have to be smaller to be narrowly tailored to pursue a 
compelling governmental (strict scrutiny). How much more narrowly 
remains to be seen.  
Turning to the buffer zones, that analysis here is simpler. The 
Court has evaluated buffer zones in the context of both injunctions and 
generally applicable laws. Looking to injunctions first, the Court has 
previously upheld a fifteen-foot injunction buffer zone in Schenck and 
a thirty-six-foot injunction buffer zone in Madsen. 259 But, in 
McCullen, the Court struck down a generally applicable thirty-five-
foot buffer. 260 This illustrates the principle that injunctions, by their 
very own nature, are more narrowly tailored than generally applicable 
laws. Therefore, when it comes to injunctions, again, under 
intermediate scrutiny, up to thirty-six feet is okay. Assuming that the 
interests that the Court found to be significant—"public safety, patient 
access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks and 
roadways"261—are also compelling (an easier assumption then with 
regard to bubble zones) it is likely that similar, if not that same, buffer 
zones would survive. Since strict scrutiny is more exacting, the Court 
may demand a closer fit here, which would reduce the buffer zone to 
somewhere between thirty-six and fifteen feet. 
Turning to generally applicable laws, however, poses a harder 
question. The only case to address generally applicable buffer zone 
was McCullen, and it struck down the thirty-five-foot buffer zone. So 
here we simply do not have much indication from the Court as to what 
distance, if any, may survive constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                 
258
 Price, 915 F.3d at 1118. 
259
 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376-77; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70, 773-74. 
260
 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 497. 
261
 Id. at 486. 
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Bubble and buffer zones around healthcare facilities are content 
based regulations. Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found them 
to be content neutral. The result is that these laws, which are aimed at 
limiting anti-abortion protestors’ First Amendment protections, only 
need to be narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental 
interest. This comes at a cost. The cost being that the Court has created 
a separate content-neutrality test applicable only to abortion clinic 
buffer and bubble zone laws. Under this test, a law is content based 
only if it cannot be justified without reference to the content of the 
speech. If the Court’s goal is to ensure that the anti-abortion protests 
do not escalate to dangerous levels, there is another way to achieve 
that result. Correctly recognizing that abortion clinic bubble and buffer 
zones are content based would mean that they are subject to strict 
scrutiny. But, that does not have to be the fatal blow to these well-
intentioned regulations.  
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